state workers' compensation systems. The Commission, after due consideration, found that state laws generally did not provide adequate, prompt, or equitable systems for com pensating disabled workers. It offered a set of 84 recommen dations for the improvement of these systems; 19 of these were deemed so important as to be "Essential Recommenda tions." The National Commission urged that if the states had not complied with this restricted list by July 1, 1975 , Congress should take steps to guarantee compliance. 3 This reform atmosphere was reflected in the appointment by William G. Milliken of a Governor's Workmen's Com pensation Advisory Commission in 1974 to: (1) review the report of the National Commission and other federal in itiatives in the occupational safety and health area; (2) evaluate the adequacy of the Michigan system; and (3) "recommend legislation to alter or amend the existing laws to ensure a just, fair and equitable workmen's compen sation program for Michigan." 4 Unfortunately, it did not prove to be a feasible assignment. The letter of transmittal from Dean St. Antoine, Chairman of the Governor's Ad visory Commission, began with the following paragraph:
It is with regret that I must inform you that your Workmen's Compensation Advisory Commission has been unable to reach agreement upon a com prehensive set of recommendations for the im provement of workers' compensation in Michigan. Every effort was made, but the obstacles were in surmountable. 5
In essence, the report of the Commission consisted of a discussion of the issues, accompanied by recapitulations of the positions adopted by employer and employee represen tatives. The document does not suggest a "near miss" on negotiating workers' compensation reform; the parties were far apart on issues ranging from the definition of disability to the statute of limitations.
After this failure to negotiate reform in face-to-face con frontations on the Governor's Advisory Commission, ef forts to forge a labor/management compromise on workers' compensation reform continued in the legislature. The most notable of these was Senate Bill 1285, introduced in December 1977 after extensive private discussions. This bipartisan proposal made a broad attack on alleged abuses of workers' compensation as well as altering the benefit for mula to reflect after-tax earnings and instituting a retrospec tive inflation adjustment plan. However, the compromise coalition eventually collapsed when the Senate Labor Com mittee began amending the package, and no legislation was enacted. As will be seen later, this bill contained many of the elements of the eventual reforms enacted in 1980. 6 Manual rates are sometimes viewed with suspicion in Michigan because of the large proportion of self-insureds in the state. In recent years, approximately 40 percent of in demnity payments have been made by self-insured employers. For that reason, it is also valuable to look at total benefit payments in the workers' compensation programs. Table 4 shows that according to data published by Daniel Price of the Social Security Administration on actual benefits paid by all employers in the various states, Michigan ranked 12th in benefit cost relative to payroll, 21 percent above the average for the nation as a whole. 8 The cost of workers' compensation in Michigan was undeniably high.
Ironically, Michigan's benefit schedule in 1978 was quite low. In that year, the maximum benefit available to Michigan claimants (if their earnings and number of dependents were sufficient to warrant it) was $171 a week. As shown in table 5, this maximum benefit ranked 28th highest among the states, i.e., lower than the median. When the maximum benefit is expressed as a proportion of each state's average weekly wage, Michigan actually ranked even lower, 39th in the nation. Furthermore, since Michigan had experienced no major changes in statute while other states had been moving to im plement some of the National Commission recommenda tions, Michigan's standing relative to those other states was steadily deteriorating. In 1972, when the average state com pliance score with the 19 essential recommendations of the National Commission stood at 6.9, Michigan had complied with 11 of the 19, ranking 4th among the states. Table 6 shows that by 1978 the average compliance score had risen to 11.7 and Michigan, still with only 11, had fallen to a rank of 27th. 11
By 1979, even those who might have preferred to do nothing rather than moving in the direction of reform along the lines of the National Commission recommendations were frustrated. There was no shortage of opinions as to what reforms were needed to cope with Michigan's problems. 12 What was missing was a spirit of compromise, or a feeling of sufficient urgency to overcome old adversarial attitudes and patterns.
When the Governor and the legislative leadership an nounced a joint Workers' Compensation Reform Task Force in May of 1979, it seemed that the lessons of the past would enable the Task Force to effectively negotiate around the shoals of previous failures and bring workers' compensation reform to reality. Unfortunately it was not to be. Agreement was reached on changes in the benefit formula and on maximums and minimums, but progress was ended when it could not be established whether the savings from coordination of benefits (which employers wanted) would truly offset the cost of inflation protection (which organized labor sought for employees). There were recriminations over the available data and accusations about the fairness of the analysis; more fundamentally there was insufficient sentiment for com promise, and neither side could impose its will on the other. After meeting intermittently from June through December 1979, the Workers' Compensation Reform Task Force col lapsed as well.
During 1980 there were occasional rumors of progress, especially when the Democratic Chairman of the Senate Labor Committee announced that a new coalition of small business and the AFL-CIO had agreed on a compromise package. Hearings were held on this package, and it was reported out by the Committee, but the lack of enthusiasm from the state's largest employers and its largest union (i.e., the auto industry) doomed the effort. Finally, in December of 1980, the Governor and the legislative leadership held a series of closed-door meetings and hammered out a minimal reform package very similar to old S.B. 1285 from 1977. When this bill (S.B. 1044) was subsequently passed and sign ed into law without major amendment, the long legislative log jam in Michigan was finally broken. Round one was at last completed.
The goal of the 1979-80 effort had been not simply to reform Michigan's workers' compensation system, but to make improvements in the system without imposing any substantial cost penalty on Michigan's already burdened employers. However, the 1980 package when evaluated by the actuarial consulting firm of Tillinghast, Nelson & War ren, was found to meet these goals only for those employers who purchased commercial insurance coverage. Estimates were that S.B. 1044 would increase the workers' compensa tion costs for this group of employers by just 0.7 percent overall. For larger employers who self-insure the increase would be in the range of 25 to 35 percent. 13 This uneven im pact resulted primarily from past inequities in income replacement rates between high-wage and low-wage workers. The old benefit formula severely capped weekly benefits for high-wage workers while sometimes giving more than 100 percent wage replacement to low-wage workers. Thus when the benefit formula was rationalized, by making the replace ment of lost wages at a more consistent rate for many more workers, employers who had formerly been paying at the relatively low maximums would experience the most signifi cant cost increases. This is demonstrated in table 7, developed from the Michigan Closed Case Survey. It shows that 98 percent of weekly payment cases from the big three auto producers were paid the maximum benefit for their dependency class in 1978. Over 73 percent of other self-insured cases and 52 per cent of carrier-insured cases also received the maximum benefit. On the other hand, no big three cases at all received the minimum benefit while 9 percent of other self-insured and 22 percent of carrier cases qualified for minimum payments.
As a result there was a massive outcry from employer groups throughout the State of Michigan. Insistent demands for workers' compensation cost reductions became an im portant part of the political climate in 1981 in many legislative districts. The pressure from employer groups, together with the general pro-business swing in the nation and in the state, resulted in another series of amendments to the workers' compensation system at the end of 1981; most of these were designed simply to reduce the cost of workers' compensation coverage for all employers large and small. These changes were enacted over the outraged objections of both the UAW and AFL-CIO.
The reform coalition this time consisted of a unanimous Republican caucus and a dozen or so "renegade" Democrats who risked the wrath of organized labor to secure leadership positions in this round of workers' compensation reform. The result was that the legislative leadership for the 1981 reforms was almost totally new; the "old hands" at workers' compensation issues were generally excluded from the pro- cess. Round two of reform in Michigan thus had a very dif ferent flavor.
While these two separate reform packages had very dif ferent objectives and mechanisms of attack, it seems ap propriate to discuss all the new provisions together to pro vide a better feel for the magnitude of change enacted in Michigan's workers' compensation system. Most of these new provisions went into effect either on January 1 or April 1, 1982. 14
Benefit Formula
The most significant change in the workers' compensation system is clearly the change in the benefit formula. This will have a direct impact on claimants and is also the single big gest cost item of all the reforms. The old benefit formula provided replacement of two-thirds of gross earnings (in cluding fringe benefits not continued during disability). The new law calls for a basic benefit of 80 percent of after-tax earnings (deductions to include federal and state income tax and OASDHI taxes). These 1980 changes were amended in 1981 to provide that fringe benefits are to be included in the calculation of the benefit only if the level of the benefit is less than the old maximum benefit. 15 
Maximum Benefit
The old maximum benefit was two-thirds of the state average weekly wage (SAWW), but less if fewer than five dependents were claimed. As noted above, this resulted in a majority of claimants receiving less than two-thirds replace ment of their gross earnings in workers' compensation benefits. 16 The new maximum benefit is set at 90 percent of the SAWW without regard to dependency. Currently the number of dependents influences the benefit level only through its effect on deductions, and thus after-tax earnings.
Reform in Michigan
The net result is that most workers who earn more than the SAWW will qualify for higher benefits than they would have under the old law.
Minimum Benefit
The old minimum benefits (which were very high due to an earlier court decision that indexed them along with the maximums) were eliminated. 17 There is now no minimum benefit for general disability cases; low-wage workers simply receive 80 percent of their after-tax earnings. Exceptions are made for fatality claims and specific loss claims, where minimum benefit levels are set at 50 percent and 25 percent of the SAWW respectively.
Coordination of Benefits
The second most significant area of reform is the coor dination of benefits between different income maintenance programs paid for, in part or in total, by the disabled worker's employer. The basic approach here is to put the workers' compensation benefit dollar last in the queue in those cases where multiple benefits are received by the claim ant. The Michigan approach is very broad; the offset against other benefits applies to unemployment insurance, other state workers' compensation benefits for the same condition, private disability, wage continuation or pension plans, Old Age and Survivor's Insurance (OASI), and "other" income maintenance plans. It is also provided that, if and when it becomes possible again, Michigan's workers' compensation benefits will be coordinated with federal Disability Insurance payments.
In each case, the workers' compensation benefit under Michigan law is reduced by benefits in these other programs according to the proportion of the benefit financed by employer payments. Thus in the case of OASI, the employer is allowed a credit of 50 percent of the monthly OASI benefit against the workers' compensation benefit, since the employer provided 50 percent of the tax payments to the OASI program. These benefit coordination provisions do not apply to benefits for specific loss claims, or to payments from disability pension plans that were in operation previous to the effective date of the statute. However, the statute specifically allows that such existing plans may be modified to allow coordination if the parties wish. These coordination of benefits provisions are expected to lead to significant cost savings for Michigan employers, particularly larger employers with extensive fringe benefit plans.
Retiree Claims
In addition to the coordination of benefits described above, there was another attack on what many had regarded as the most flagrant abuse of Michigan's workers' compen sation system-claims from retired workers. The 1980 package introduced a new presumption of no loss of earn ings or earning capacity on the part of a claimant who is receiving nondisability pension or retirement benefits (in cluding OASI). While this presumption can be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, it should help to reduce claims from retired workers, especially when considered in conjunction with the offset for other retirement benefits pro vided under the coordination of benefits provisions.
Inflation Protection
The 1980 reforms also included the addition of a new retrospective inflation protection plan applying to all cases with injury dates before January 1, 1980. A state-financed Compensation Supplement Fund was established for this purpose. A benefit supplement equal to the increase in the SAWW (not to exceed 5 percent for any year) is to be paid to all continuing claims from these years. The benefit adjust-ment payments are made by the insurers directly to claimants, with quarterly reimbursements from the Compen sation Supplement Fund. This provision is an attempt to maintain a major share of the original purchasing power of workers' compensation benefits for existing long term disability cases. There are no provisions for additional ad justments in the future for these or other claimants, but the Director of the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation is ordered to conduct biannual studies of the general ade quacy of benefits, specifically including the impact of infla tion.
Statute of Limitations
Both the 1980 and 1981 reform packages addressed the statute of limitations under the workers' compensation law. The old statute of limitations had been rendered ineffective by a requirement that if the employer did not give notice of the injury to the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensa tion, the time period did not begin to toll. The 1980 reforms resurrected by the statute by striking the employer notice re quirement and simply providing that the claim must be entered within two years of the occurrence of the injury, the date the disability manifests itself, or the last day of employ ment. The 1981 reforms recomplicated this by adding a new requirement that the employee must give notice to the employer within 90 days of the injury. If this requirement is not met, the employer can contest the case on the grounds that the failure by the employee to provide notification of the injury prejudiced the employer's defense against the claim. 18
Definition of Disability
Both packages also attacked the issue of the definition of disability. The 1980 reforms contained language designed to tighten up on claims involving mental disabilities, conditions resulting from the aging process, and social and recreational injuries. The 1981 reform went much deeper into the substance of the law. It defined disability in terms of a general field of employment, rather than a specific job as in the old law. It also separated the issue of disability from that of wage loss in an attempt to further tighten eligibility stan dards. There is a new provision for disqualification if the claimant refuses a bona fide offer of reasonable employ ment. A significant complication was introduced concerning reemployment and favored work. If an injured employee has returned to work for more than 100 weeks and subsequently loses that job, only partial disability payments can be paid. If fewer than 100 weeks of new work experience are obtain ed, full disability eligibility is maintained on the basis of the original job.
There is also a requirement for notification to the Michigan Employment Security Commission when disabled workers are unemployed. That agency is directed to give priority treatment to such referrals. The intent was to urge partially disabled workers to return to work, but the statute is so complex it will take some sorting out by the courts. Meanwhile, the entire definition of disability section is slated to expire at the end of 1984.
Logging Industry
The 1980 package expanded the Silicosis and Dust Disease Fund to the Silicosis, Dust Disease, and Logging Industry Compensation Fund (emphasis added). This imposes a $12,500 insurer liability limit on each workers' compensation claim arising in the logging industry. Any benefits above $12,500 per claim will be paid by the Fund rather than the in dividual insurer. This has the effect of transferring the burden of expensive claims in the logging industry to the general employer population, since the Fund is financed by proportional assessment on all employers. This special fund is due to expire at the end of 1985.
Medical Costs
Another complicating provision is the imposition of a medical cost regulation scheme into the workers' compensa tion system. The Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensa tion is directed to establish fee schedules for medical treat ment under the workers' compensation statute. In addition, they are to monitor the performance of providers of service and establish utilization review procedures for individual workers' compensation cases. This reflects the interest of one of the major Democratic participants in the 1981 reform coalition.
Redemptions
The 1981 reform package also included an outright pro hibition of redemptions (compromise and release set tlements) for any petitions filed after January 1, 1984. In asmuch as 70 percent of all litigated cases are redeemed in Michigan (settled with a lump sum), this provision could have enormous significance for the way the Michigan workers' compensation system really works. 19 No one is yet able to predict what this will mean, however.
Rate-making
Last, but by no means least, reform of the workers' com pensation insurance procedures should also be reported here. Even though this provision was not enacted until 1982, it was under discussion with the 1981 reforms, and everyone understood it to be a part of the total package. The legislature mandated a 20 percent rollback for the 1982 policy year in the average manual premium rate for workers' compensation insurance coverage in the state. They also directed that Michigan should move to "open competition" in workers' compensation insurance rates effective January 1, 1983.
Michigan's system provides for a "file and use" procedure with a new public body, the Workers' Compensation Data Collection Agency, responsible for collecting and disseminating the pure premium data to be used by the in dividual insurance companies to set their rates. Undoubted ly, the way that workers' compensation insurance carriers do their business will be altered; it is not clear exactly what im pact this change in procedures will have on the system as a whole. Those who promoted this reform felt that it would lead to lower prices for workers' compensation insurance as the competitive pressures of the free market were felt in the insurance industry. 20
There are many smaller changes that have been omitted from this discussion, some of which may turn out to have greater significance than is evident now. The most important point to make may be that many of these enactments will de pend on court decisions for their specific content. Obviously, it will be some years before the true impact of this entire set of reforms will be apparent. At the moment, one must be content to point out the significant changes that have been accomplished: (1) the benefit structure has been rationalized considerably; (2) some of the most serious abuses cited by employer groups have been addressed; and (3) part of the loss imposed on the long term disabled by inflation in the last decade has been restored.
Early in 1982, commercial insurance carriers through the Workers' Compensation Rating and Inspection Association of Michigan (WCRIAM) filed for a rate reduction of 22 per cent in the average workers' compensation premium. As was discussed earlier, this was not the result of an actuarial evaluation, but was WCRIAM's response to a legislatively mandated rollback of at least 20 percent in premium levels. Thus it is not at all clear that this represents the actual an ticipated cost impact of the reforms.
Even if some of the reforms turn out to have been illadvised, any errors were the natural by-product of the pressure-cooker legislative environment that was required to break the stalemate that had developed in Michigan. It is to be hoped that necessary updating will not prove as difficult in the future. Taken as a whole, the two rounds of reform appear to constitute a significant improvement in Michigan's workers' compensation system.
